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In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal 
their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates 
the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of 
voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to 
the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may 
exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large 
changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of 
turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, 
while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the 
model predicts that smaller communities have more volatile turnout than larger communities. 
JEL-Code: C700, D720, D800. 
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What motivates citizens to vote is one of the fundamental questions of political science
and public economics. Since the early writings of Downs (1957) and later on Ledyard
(1984), the rational-choice theory puts the desire of citizens to aect the election out-
come as the main driving factor of their voting behavior. But, since the probability to
actually change the outcome is very small, the instrumental view of voting generates
the paradox of not voting1, which has led many researchers to propose dierent
reasons that drive voting incentives.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formal model of voting as a signaling
device, and, in doing so, to provide a rational choice model which does not generate the
paradox of not voting. The main idea is that citizens possess unobserved characteristics,
such as their preferences for public goods or their degree of altruism, which they signal
to others through voting. If informative, these signals benet both the sender and
the receiver, because they facilitate the creation of mutually benecial cooperations or
because they increase the trust in an already given relation. Examples of cooperations
are exchanging information about job opportunities, helping each other to take care of
daily issues, etc.
More specically, we consider a two-period extension of B orgers (2004) model in a
nite-agent economy, which is divided into neighborhoods. In the rst period citizens
decide to vote or not and they also observe whether their neighbors voted. In the
second period, after mutual agreement, each citizen can form partnerships with any of
her neighbors2. Citizens derive utility from both the outcome of the election, as in the
instrumental view, and the formation of partnerships in the second stage. Their utilities,
however, depend on two unobservable characteristics: (i) their cost of voting, (ii) a
preference parameter, the latter denoting the utility from both the election outcome and
the partnership. The parameter can be interpreted as either representing the intensity
of preferences for public goods (both global and local) or as representing the degree
of one's altruism. The crucial assumption is that the utility of the election outcome
is correlated with the utility of the partnership (the assumption that this correlation
is perfect in our model is not so important and can be relaxed). Because it is costly
to form partnerships, a citizen is willing to cooperate with her neighbor only if the
1For a formal treatment, see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985).
2An alternative interpretation of the second stage is that each citizen has already a network of
friends and each one of them decides whether to increase the degree of interaction with her friends or
not.
2latter has a high intensity of preferences for public goods. As a result, citizens' voting
incentives are enhanced by their willingness to signal their preferences for cooperation
to their neighbors.
We nd the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game and we analyze the most in-
teresting case: stable interior equilibria with signaling, that is stable equilibria where
a fraction of agents from every type votes. We show that such equilibria exist and we
compute their comparative statics. The main results are as follows:
1. The presence of signaling strictly increases voting incentives and electoral turnout
when compared to models without signaling eects, like B orgers (2004). This is
a direct implication of the value of signaling and the utility that citizens receive
from social interactions.
2. Even in economies with very large populations, the value of signaling does not
tend to zero and therefore the paradox of not voting does not arise (or more
precisely the set of parameter values, according to which non-voting equilibria
exist, shrinks).
3. Communities with closer personal ties and higher level of social interaction present
higher turnout.
4. Due to signaling, electoral incentives may exhibit \bandwagon" eects: the benet
of voting may increase with turnout, so that one's willingness to vote increases
if the expected participation rate increases. To the best of our knowledge, this
is in contrast to existing papers on rational voting, where the benet of voting is
always decreasing with turnout due to the decreasing pivotal probability.
5. Signaling incentives interact with direct electoral incentives so that even a small
change in the importance of the election may generate a sizable increase in
turnout. This is because turnout may be highly sensitive to signaling eects.
In particular, in countries with low cost of social interaction (low opportunity
costs of time, bad substitutes to social interaction), the presence of signaling in-
creases the sensitivity of turnout to electoral incentives. On the other hand, in
countries with high cost of social interaction, the presence of signaling decreases
the sensitivity of turnout to electoral incentives. In terms of empirical predic-
tions, the model suggests that communities with high cost of social interaction
should have lower volatility of turnout in response to changes in the importance
3of elections than communities with lower costs of social interactions. In terms
of policy, the model predicts that increasing the value of the election (through
increasing the awareness of citizens about the policy agenda or through political
advertising) has a higher impact on electoral turnout in communities with lower
interaction costs and closer community ties.
The model captures in a simple way the interaction between electoral and social incen-
tives, which we believe is an important driving force of voting incentives. A growing
number of empirical papers (Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008), Funk (2010), see also
below) show that social considerations and pressures play an important role in citizens'
voting decisions. Also our study is motivated by common experience and intuition.
Neighbors often cooperate to provide local public goods, like taking kids to school or
taking care of communal spaces, while friends and colleagues engage in mutually ben-
ecial interactions, like information sharing and undertaking of small favors. Signaling
one's good will, trustworthiness, or interest in joint undertakings can thus have signif-
icant value when compared with relatively low cost activities, like voting. Our model
formalizes this intuition and shows that the eects on direct electoral incentives can
actually be large.
There are many strands of the literature which are related to our paper. Overbye
(1995), Posner (1998) and Bufacchi (2001) also argue that reputation and signaling
reasons can account for the voting behavior of citizens in modern democracies, but
they provide no formal analysis. By constructing a rigorous model formalizing this
idea, we are able to make testable predictions which relate the voting behavior to the
social conditions of individuals.
Also, Funk (2005) analyzes a voting model with signaling incentives. However,
there are two main dierences between her paper and ours. First, in her model voting
takes place in order to signal one's willingness to comply with social norms, while
in our model the signaling concerns one's ability to cooperate in mutually benecial
interactions. Second, the main focus of our analysis is the interaction between electoral
and signaling incentives, while Funk (2005) ignores electoral incentives and focuses on
the impact of new technologies, which reduce the cost of voting, to signaling incentives
and turnout.
Other papers, such as Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan (2007), Fowler (2006) and Rotem-
berg (2009), argue that social preferences and altruism are the main driving forces of
voting behavior. While our model does not focus on this explanation, one of the inter-
4pretations of the citizens' unobserved parameter is that it represents social preferences.
However, this parameter generates two voting eects in our model: one direct and one
indirect, through signaling. The second channel, which is our main focus of study, is
absent from the social preferences literature.
There exist several other theoretical approaches to voting incentives. According
to the ethical voting literature (Harsanyi (1980), Coate and Conlin (2004), Feddersen
and Sandroni (2006)) voters decide on the ground of moral principles and they derive
utility from adhering to them. The leader-follower theories (Uhlaner (1989), Morton
(1991), Shachar and Nalebu (1999), Herrera and Martinelli (2006)) emphasize the
role of leaders and their ability to impose sanctions or to provide rewards in motivating
social groups to participate in elections. Castanheira (2003) argue that voting benet
can be high, since the implemented platform after the elections depends not only on
the winner, but also on the margin of victory. Papers on expressive voting (Brennan
and Hamlin (1998), Engelen (2006)) assert that voting is a consumption good in itself,
because it allows individuals to arm their own beliefs and values. Contributions to
the literature on social norms (e.g., Coleman (1990)) point out that voting is a public
good in itself and show how social norms are used to overcome the associated free-rider
problem.3
We do not question the relevance of these approaches. Rather, the theory presented
here provides an additional rationale for voting, which may complement the arguments
put forward in existing literature, and which has not been analyzed so far.
Finally, our model generates predictions which are consistent with empirical and
experimental results. An increasing number of papers nds that social pressure, close
community ties and voter participation increase the voting incentives for community
members. Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) show as a result of a large-scale eld
experiment that turnout was substantially higher among people who received a letter
before the elections, which was explaining that whether they voted or not would be
made public among the neighbors. Funk (2010) nds that voter turnout was negatively
aected in small communities of Switzerland after the introduction of postal voting. Her
explanation is that although postal voting decreased the voting costs, it also removed
signaling benet of voting, which was substantial in small communities. Gerber and
Rogers (2009) nd that a message publicizing high expected turnout is more eective
at motivating people to vote than a message publicizing low expected turnout. This
3For more complete surveys, see Aldrich (1993), Blais (2000), Dhillon and Peralta (2002), Feddersen
(2004).
5result in spite of lower pivotal probability with higher turnout is consistent with the
signaling benet and the bandwagon eect of our model. Similarly, an experiment of
sequential voting by Groer and Schram (2006) shows that high turnout of early voters
increases late voters' turnout.4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two presents the model, section three pro-
vides the equilibrium analysis, section four presents the main comparative statics and
results and section ve includes the nal comments and conclusions. Most proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
There are N individuals, i = 1;2;:::;N, and two political parties, A and B. Each
individual is summarized by three characteristics. The rst one is the preferred party
of the individual i: Ri 2 fA;Bg. The second one is her cost of voting, ci 2 [cmin;cmax]
with 0  cmin < cmax. The last characteristic is whether she is of high or low type,
(i) 2 fH;Lg, which refers to the importance the individual i attaches to decisions
taken in the public domain. Each characteristic of any individual i is a random variable.
All the three characteristics are stochastically independent of each other and between
individuals. The preferred party of any individual i is A with probability 1=2 and B with
probability 1=2. The cost of voting ci of any individual i is distributed according to the
cdf F on the support [cmin;cmax] with the pdf f which is positive on all of the support.
Finally, any individual is of high type, (i) = H, with probability q and of low type,
(i) = L, with probability 1   q. Each individual privately knows her characteristics.
The distributions of individuals' characteristics are common knowledge.
There are two periods. In the rst period, the election occurs in which an individual
chooses to vote for her preferred party or to abstain.5 The winner is determined by a
simple majority rule. In case of a tie, each party wins with probability 1=2.
An individual i's payo from the rst period is as follows: Her benet is w1(i)
if her preferred party wins and 0 otherwise. w1 is a parameter which measures the
importance of the election. We assume that both types care about the result of the
election, as measured by the parameter (i), and that a high type individual cares more
about it than a low type individual, i.e. H > L > 0. Her cost is ci if she votes and 0
4For other papers which study the relation between social interactions and political participation,
see for instance Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (1995) and Schram and Sonnemans (1996).
5Since voting for the other party is a weakly dominated strategy, we do not consider this strategy.
6otherwise. Hence, if she votes and her preferred party wins, her payo is w1(i)   ci.
If she abstains and her preferred party wins, her payo is w1(i). If she votes and her
preferred party loses, her payo is  ci. If she abstains and her preferred party loses,
her payo is 0.
In the second period, social interactions occur in neighborhoods composed of n
individuals in the form of pairwise matches. After observing whether each one of her
neighbors voted or not, an individual i chooses to match or not with each individual
j = 1;2;:::;n, j 6= i. If both i and j agree to match with each other, they match
together. Otherwise, a match does not occur.
An individual i's payo from a match with an individual j depends both on her own
type and her neighbor's type and we adopt the following simple interaction payo:
w2(i)((j)   d) (1)
where d is the matching cost and w2 measures the importance of social interactions.
Equation (1) provides i's payo from a match with j, when j's type is known to i.
However, since j's type is private information, i needs to evaluate her expected payo,
after she has updated her belief about j's type, given j's voting choice. The formulation
of the expected payo of i and the analysis of her best response are provided in the
following section. We assume that L < d < H. Hence, in the perfect information
case, an individual would agree (respectively, would not agree) to match with a high
(respectively, low) type individual. Moreover, since H > L, if a match has a positive
expected payo, a high type individual has a higher expected payo from this match
than a low type individual. These \matches" or \interactions" are independent and non-
exclusive, meaning that each agent can potentially interact with all of her neighbors if
they also want to interact with her and the utility of each match is not aected by the
other matches.
As in B orgers (2004), we make two symmetry assumptions about the voting strategy.
We assume that it does not depend on the individual's preferred party and that all
individuals play the same strategy of the form s : fH;Lg  [cmin;cmax] ! f0;1g where
si((i);ci) = 0 (respectively 1) means that an individual i abstains (respectively votes)
if she is of type (i) and her cost of voting is ci.
Similarly to the voting strategy, we assume that the matching strategy does not
depend on the individual's and on her potential partner's preferred parties and that
7every individual i plays the same strategy of the form6 I : f0;1g ! f0;1g with regards
to an individual j, i 6= j. I(sj) = 0 (respectively 1) means that an individual i
does not agree (respectively agrees) to match with an individual j if the individual j's
voting decision is sj. Hence, a match between individuals i and j occurs if and only if
I(sj)  I(si) = 1.
The formulation in (1) captures, in a stylized way, essential features of social inter-
actions with a public good character. We interpret a high type individual as one who
has a higher preference for the activity procured by the social interaction, and hence is
more willing to contribute to the \public good" than a low type individual. That's why,
agents want to match with a high type individual, and not with a low type individual.
Interpreting the result of the election and social interaction processes as public goods,
a high type individual gets a higher benet in case of the victory of her preferred party
and in case of a match. Therefore, her voting behavior can be a signal about her type,
given that she is more likely to vote than a low type individual. The signal can be
valuable since agents interact with each other if and only if they have posterior beliefs
that the other one is of high type with a high enough probability.
Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, we pro-
ceed by backward induction.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We rst analyze the second stage of the game where agents decide whether to interact
with each of their neighbors or not, after observing their voting behavior. Subsequently,
we will use the equilibria of the second stage in order to analyze the rst stage.
3.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium
Recall from the previous section that equation (1) provides i's payo from a match with
j. The expected payo of i from a match with j, when j's type is private information
and conditional on j's voting decision, is given by:
EPij = w2(i) [(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)]I(si)I(sj) (2)
6We show in the appendix that the assumption that the matching strategy depends only on the
potential partner's voting decision, and not on the individual's own type and own voting decision is
not a restriction.
8Here, (sj) is the posterior belief that a neighbor who voted (sj = 1) or did not vote
(sj = 0) is of type H. For later use, we dene (1) = H, which is the posterior
belief that a neighbor, who voted, is of high type, and 1   (0) = L, which is the
posterior belief that a neighbor, who did not vote, is of low type. I(sj), as given in the
previous section, denotes the decision of agent i (who has type (i)) whether to match
with neighbor j or not, conditional on the latter's voting behavior (sj). The overall
second stage utility of i from all her neighbors is simply the summation over all possible





w2(i) [(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)]I(si)I(sj)
	
(3)
The best-response of i in the second stage of the game depends on the voting be-
havior of her neighbors and her posterior beliefs regarding their type. By (2), it is clear
that the best-response for i is to match with every neighbor who generates a positive
interaction payo and not to interact if the expected payo is negative. Therefore, her
best response depends on the sign of  = [(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)]I(si):
I(sj) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if  > 0
0 if  < 0
f0;1g if  = 0
(4)
We examine pure-strategy symmetric equilibria, which do not exhibit coordination
failures7. We ignore the latter type of equilibria for two reasons. First, they are not
robust to small changes of the solution concept or the structure of the game. For
example, if we eliminate weakly dominated strategies or use the trembling hand perfect
equilibrium concept these coordination failures disappear from the set of equilibria.
Second, they are not interesting in terms of empirical implications and provide no
insight to the issue at hand. Focusing on pure-strategy symmetric equilibria with no
coordination failures allows us to generate the following lemma8:
7Because of the structure of the game, there are equilibria of the subgame where, irrespectively
of the posterior beliefs, nobody interacts with anyone else. This is a simple case of coordination
failure, where every individual is indierent between interacting or not with her neighbors because she
anticipates that none of her neighbors will interact with her, even if the interaction would generate
positive payo for both sides.
8The proof is included in the appendix.
9Lemma 1. When restricting attention to pure-strategy symmetric equilibria, the fol-
lowing equilibria can result in the second stage:
1. Agents choose to interact with both voters and non-voters. This is an equilibrium
if and only if the expected payo from matching with both types is non-negative,
which is the case when HH + (1   H)L  d and (1   L)H + LL  d.
2. Agents choose to interact with only voters. This is an equilibrium if and only if
HH + (1   H)L  d and (1   L)H + LL  d.
3. Agents choose to interact with only non-voters. This is an equilibrium if and only
if HH + (1   H)L  d and (1   L)H + LL  d.
4. Agents choose to interact with neither voters nor non-voters. This is an equilib-
rium if and only if HH + (1   H)L  d and (1   L)H + LL  d.
3.2 First-Stage Equilibrium
In this subsection, we compute the expected benet of voting, depending on the second
period equilibrium. Then, we prove that, for an expected turnout strictly between 0%
and 100%, we cannot have a second period equilibrium where only non-voters match
among each other. After making a list of possible types of rst period equilibria, we
show the existence of one of the most interesting equilibria. We begin by the following
remark:
In equilibrium, an individual votes if her expected benet from voting exceeds her
cost of voting. Since the benet of voting is independent of the cost, an equilibrium
voting strategy must be a threshold strategy like in B orgers (2004). So, there is some
c
H such that s(H;ci) = 1 if ci < c
H and s(H;ci) = 0 if ci > c
H. Similarly, there is
some c
L such that s(L;ci) = 1 if ci < c
L and s(L;ci) = 0 if ci > c
L. Hence, the ex ante
probability that any individual votes is p = qF(c
H) + (1   q)F(c
L). For 0 < p < 1, the
posterior beliefs that a neighbor who voted is of high type, i.e. H, and that a neighbor









(1   q)(1   F(c
L))
(1   q)(1   F(c
L)) + q(1   F(c
H))
(6)
10The expected benet of voting is the sum of two terms. The rst one which we call
the expected electoral benet arises because one's vote can possibly change the electoral
outcome. This is the standard benet of voting in the literature. The second one which
we call as the expected signaling benet arises because one's vote can possibly change
one's outcome from the social interaction stage.
The expected electoral benet of voting of an individual i is equal to 1
2(i)w1(p),
where (p) is the probability that individual i is pivotal. This happens if her preferred
party receives either the same number of votes as the other party or receives one less vote
than the other party among the voters but her. In both cases, by voting for her preferred
party, she increases the probability that her preferred party wins by 1=2. Taking into
account that her benet is (i)w1 if her preferred party wins and 0 otherwise, we get
the above expression. The expression of (p) is as given in B orgers (2004), who also
shows that this is a dierentiable and decreasing function for all p 2 (0;1).
We denote by B(i)(cH;cL) the total expected benet of voting of an individual i
with type (i) as a function of the thresholds cH and cL. An equilibrium is given by
thresholds c
H and c
L such that B(i)(c
H;c
L)  ci for all i who vote and B(i)(c
H;c
L)  ci
for all i who abstain.
For the four types of second period equilibria described in Lemma 1, we have the
following total expected benets of voting, where p;H;L are functions of cH and cL:











(p) + w2p(n   1)[HH + (1   H)L   d]
o
(8)




(p)   w2(1   p)(n   1)[(1   L)H + LL   d]
o
(9)







11In all the four types of the second period equilibria, the expected electoral benet
is the same. However, the expected signaling benet diers. In the second type,
only voters match among each other. Hence, if an individual votes, she matches
with all voters in her neighborhood. Her expected payo from a single match is
w2(i)[HH +(1 H)L d] and the expected number of voters (and so of matches)
in her neighborhood but her is p(n 1). Hence, if she votes, this gives her an expected
payo of w2(i)p(n   1)[HH + (1   H)L   d] in the second period. If she does
not vote, she does not match with anyone, so her payo is 0 in the second period.
The payo dierence between the two cases where she votes or does not vote gives the
expected signaling benet of voting.
In the rst and fourth types, everyone matches with each other or no one matches
irrespective of the voting behavior. Hence, the expected signaling benet is nil. In the
third type, only non-voters match among each other. Hence, if an individual votes, she
does not match with anyone, so her payo is 0 in the second period. If she does not
vote, she matches with all non-voters in her neighborhood. Her expected payo from a
single match is w2(i)[(1 L)H +LL  d] and the expected number of non-voters
(and so of matches) in her neighborhood but her is (1 p)(n 1). Hence, if she does not
vote, this gives her an expected payo of w2(i)(1 p)(n 1)[(1 L)H +LL  d]
in the second period. Hence, there is a negative expected signaling benet. However,
as we show next, this case cannot occur in an equilibrium with 0 < p < 1.
We observe that BL = BH in any case where  = L=H. Using this, we can show
the following9:
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium with 0 < p < 1, we have H > 1   L.
As shown in Lemma 1, the third type of second period equilibria (where only non-
voters match among each other) can happen only if HH + (1   H)L  d and
(1 L)H +LL  d. But these inequalities cannot hold together when H > 1 L.
Hence, by Lemma 2, the third type of second period equilibria cannot occur if 0 < p <
1.10
Given that BH > BL, we have six possible types of rst period equilibria:
(i) Everyone votes: BH(cmax;cmax);BL(cmax;cmax)  cmax.
9The proof is included in the appendix.
10In fact, it can occur if p = 0 or p = 1, but only when we take advantage of arbitrariness of beliefs
out of equilibrium path and assign \unrealistic" beliefs.
12(ii) Nobody votes: BH(cmin;cmin);BL(cmin;cmin)  cmin.
(iii) All high type individuals vote and none of low type individuals votes: BH(cmax;cmin) 
cmax and BL(cmax;cmin)  cmin.




L where cmin < c
L < cmax.




H;cmin)  cmin where cmin < c
H < cmax.







L where cmin < c
L;c
H < cmax.
We focus on the last type of equilibria where some of each type of individuals vote. We
call these equilibria as interior equilibria.
An interior equilibrium implies c
L = c
H since BL = BH, and satises 0 < p <
1. So, by Lemma 2, an interior equilibrium is not consistent with the third type of
second period equilibria where only non-voters match among each other. In addition,
an equilibrium including the rst or fourth type of second period equilibria involves
no signaling. These equilibria are not very interesting, in the sense that they generate
the same nal outcomes as B orgers (2004)11 and, therefore, provide no new insight into
voters' behavior than the existing literature. Our main interest being the signaling
aspect of voting, we focus on interior equilibria with the second type of second period













where cmin= < c
H < cmax. Since then, BL(c
H;c
L) = c
L and cmin < c
L < cmax
follow immediately. Such an equilibrium is stable if after a slight increase (decrease)
in cH, and the corresponding increase (decrease) in cL = cH, the benet from voting
falls short of (exceeds) the cost so that the share of voters falls (rises) back to the
equilibrium. Formally, dening BH(cH)  BH(cH;cH) for all cH, we we can write the
11The only dierence being that the analysis in B orgers (2004) should be applied both to high type
and low type individuals.
13expected benet for type H as a function of only the cuto cH. With this denition,
the equilibrium is stable if
@BH
@cH   1 < 0.
In order to show that the subsequent analysis of stable interior equilibria is well
founded, we complete this section by proving that such an equilibrium exists for some











(q + (1   q)F(cmax)) (13)









(1   q)(1   F(cH))
q(1   F(cH))
(14)
Note that inequality (14) is equivalent to the inequalities, HH + (1   H)L  d
and (1   L)H + LL  d, which ensure that only voters match among each other
in the second period (see Lemma 1, case 2). Inequalities (12) and (13) are boundary
conditions requiring that the benet of voting exceeds (falls short of) the cost of voting
if the turnout is very low (very high).
Proposition 1.
(i) If inequality (14) holds for all cH 2 [cmin=;cmax], and inequalities (12) and (13)
hold, then a stable interior equilibrium with signaling exists.
(ii) There exist parameter values of the model which satisfy simultaneously the above
inequalities.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we provide the main comparative statics of stable interior equilibria with
signaling, which have been shown to exist in the previous section. In the rst subsection
4.1, we derive some direct eects of the model's parameters on equilibrium turnout. In
subsection 4.2, we turn to the interaction between signaling and the incentives to vote,
which is the main focus of our analysis.
144.1 Direct eects
By substituting the posterior beliefs (5) and (6) in equation (8) and by linking the cut-
o value of low types to the cut-o value of high types via cL = cH, the equilibrium





[qF(cH) + (1   q)F(cH)]
+ w2(n   1)[qF(cH)(H   d) + (1   q)F(cH)(L   d)]
o
= cH (15)
By using the implicit function theorem one can compute the eect of a change of a











Since we are considering a stable equilibrium of the game, we know that @BH=@cH < 1,
so that the denominator of the above expression is negative. Therefore, the change of
the equilibrium cuto c
H has the same sign as the change of the total expected utility
(BH) with respect to the parameter x. Moreover, the change of the equilibrium turnout
p = qF(c
H) + (1   q)F(c
H) has also the same sign unless the parameter x is q, H,
or L. As a consequence, we have the following comparative statics of the model:
(i)
dp
dd < 0: An increase in the cost of the second stage interaction decreases the value
of signaling and equilibrium turnout.
(ii)
dp
dw1 > 0 and
dp
dw2 > 0: Directly increasing the signicance that voters put in the
election or the signicance of signaling increases equilibrium turnout.
(iii)
dp
dN < 0 but
dp
dn > 0: Increasing the size of the electorate reduces the probability
of being pivotal and hence the electoral benet and thus equilibrium turnout decrease.
This is, of course, a direct implication of the (p) function, which is the same as in
B orgers (2004). However, notice that, even if N is arbitrarily large, the value of signaling
remains strictly positive in the set of equilibria that we examine and the equilibrium
turnout does not fall to zero. To put it dierently, even if we examine arbitrarily
15large societies, we can nd values for the remaining parameters such that an interior
equilibrium with strictly positive turnout exists and the paradox of not voting does
not take place. This is because, even though agents can not aect the outcome of the
election, they receive strictly positive utility by signaling their type to other agents. On
the other hand, an increase in the number of neighbors increases the value of signaling
and equilibrium turnout.
The comparative statics above have a straightforward interpretation, which comes di-
rectly from the model: any change that increases the value of the electoral outcome or
the value of signaling or both, increases the willingness of the marginal voter to vote
and, therefore, it increases the equilibrium turnout. As the following result shows, the
model however also generates some eects which are more involved.
(iv)
dp
dH has an ambiguous sign12: On the one hand, as expected, turnout ratio of high
type agents increases unambiguously if they value the benet of voting higher. On
the other hand, turnout ratio of low type agents may decrease or increase due to two
opposing eects: the decrease in voting benet due to lower pivotal probability induced
by the higher turnout of high type agents, and the increase in signaling benet through
the increased benet of a match with a high type agent and the increase of the numbers
of matches with high type agents (again due to the higher turnout of high type agents).
If turnout ratio of low type agents increases, then overall turnout ratio clearly increases.
Otherwise, the result is ambiguous.
4.2 Interaction of signaling and voting incentives
After discussing these comparative static eects, which are direct consequences of in-
troducing signaling into the model, we turn to the more subtle, and possibly even more
interesting, indirect eects. Specically, we ask: How do the benets of voting and of
signaling interact? Does the presence of signaling increase the sensitivity of turnout
to the importance of the election outcome for voters? In other words, we would like
to investigate the conditions under which the presence of signaling in a voting game
reinforces or dampens the sensitivity of turnout to the electoral incentives. This is
interesting both in terms of empirical implications (are countries with better connected











16communities expected to have more volatile turnout?) and in terms of policy implica-
tions (should governments adopt community friendly policies to increase the sensitivity
of voters to political issues?). For brevity, whenever the sensitivity of the turnout to
electoral incentives increases with signaling we say that we have a reinforcing signal-
ing eect, while whenever the sensitivity of the turnout to electoral incentives decreases
with signaling we say that we have a dampening signaling eect.
Moreover, we investigate whether there can be a bandwagon eect, i.e. whether
a voter is more likely to vote when there is higher turnout. Note that in the absence
of signaling, this is impossible, since higher turnout decreases the pivotal probability
of a voter, who is then less likely to vote. In addition, we ask whether an increase in
turnout ratio can be substantial in case of a small increase of the election's signicance
(w1). Note again that this cannot be the case in the absence of signaling, since the
eect of w1 is downgraded by small pivotal probabilities.
4.2.1 Reinforcing or dampening signaling eects
In terms of formal analysis, we study whether signaling is reinforcing or dampening by
examining how the change of c
H due to an increase in the signicance of the elections
is aected by an increase in the value of signaling. Therefore, if
d2c
H
dw1dw2 > 0 we have
reinforcing signaling and if
d2c
H
dw1dw2 < 0 we have dampening signaling. Since an increase
in the equilibrium cut-o value c
H always increases the equilibrium turnout p for given
values of q, H and L, examining the eect on c
H also gives us the impact on p. By












Since the denominator and
@BH
@w1 are both positive, the sign of the expression above has
the same sign as
@2BH
@cH@w2. By computing the latter cross-derivative and rearranging we
nd that we have reinforcing signaling if and only if (recall that  = L=H):
(H   d)qf(cH) + (L   d)(1   q)f(cH) > 0 (17)
Inequality (17) illustrates the interaction of voting and signaling incentives. When the
election importance (w1) increases, there are qf(cH) additional individuals of high type
and (1   q)f(cH) additional individuals of low type who decide to vote. Inequality
17(17) states that the expected payo of matching with these additional voters is positive.
In this case, the expected signaling benet of voting increases, which reinforces the
increase in turnout due to the higher importance of the election.
Solving inequality (17) for the parameter d we nd a critical threshold value (let
us call it ~ ), such that if d is below this threshold, then we have reinforcing signaling,
while if d is above this threshold we have dampening signaling. We summarize this
result in the following proposition, which is directly derived from the analysis so far:
Proposition 2. In any stable interior equilibrium with signaling (i.e. agents interact
only with voters) we have a reinforcing signaling eect whenever the cost of matching
d is below the threshold value ~  and dampening signaling otherwise, with
~  
Hqf(cH) + L(1   q)f(cH)
qf(cH) + (1   q)f(cH)
(18)
Note that, if we dene w2p(n   1)[HH + (1   H)L   d] in equation (8) as the








Hence, if an increase in the total turnout has a positive eect on the value of
signaling, then this implies that signaling has a reinforcing eect on voting. The inter-
pretation is that if the signicance of the elections increases (w1 increases) then turnout
will increase because the overall expected benet for voters increases. But whether this
eect is larger or smaller than in a society where the signaling benet is absent (i.e.
B orgers (2004)) or where communities are less important (lower value of w2), depends
on the impact of the increased turnout on the signaling benet. If turnout has a pos-
itive impact on signaling then the increase in turnout will be greater in the society
with stronger community ties (
d2c
H
dw1dw2 > 0), because the initial increase in the value of
voting is further reinforced by the fact that voting is also more benecial for signaling
one's type to her \neighbors". Of course, the opposite is true if the signaling benet is
negatively aected by higher turnout.
Proposition 2 makes clear that in a society where the cost of social interactions is
low (d < ~ ), for instance due to inadequate substitutes to social interactions or because
of well-established communication channels, signaling has a reinforcing eect, while the
opposite is true for a society with high cost of social interactions. Hence, we expect
18the turnout ratio to be more sensitive to the importance of the electoral outcome in
societies with low cost of social interactions.
Beyond this general result, it is worthwhile to investigate in more detail whether,
and in what circumstances, the condition d < ~  is likely to be satised in an equilibrium
with signaling. To answer this question, we relate ~  to the inequalities laid down in case
2 of Lemma 1. These inequalities implicitly dene an interval [dL;dH], within which
the cost d of the match must lie for an equilibrium with signaling to obtain.
If ~  is greater than the upper bound of the interval [dL;dH], i.e. ~  > dH, then
signaling has a reinforcing eect on voting irrespectively of the other parameters of the
model. If ~  is lower than the lower bound of the interval, i.e. ~  < dL, then signaling
has a dampening eect on voting, irrespectively of the other parameters of the model,
and if ~  is in the interior of the interval, the eect of signaling is either reinforcing or
dampening, depending on the other parameters of the model. The following proposition
relates these cases to the distribution of voting costs13:
Proposition 3. Consider an interior equilibrium with signaling and cuto value c
H


















H), the eect of signaling is reinforcing for some parameter









H), then the eect of signaling is dampening.
Note that the condition of part (ii) in Proposition 3 is a weaker version of the
increasing hazard rate, which is commonly used in the literature. This means that,
if the distribution of voting costs satises the increasing hazard rate property, then
whether signaling has a reinforcing or dampening eect depends on the cost of social
interactions, d, as given in Proposition 2. On the other hand, ensuring that all the
stable interior equilibria of the model for any set of parameter values exhibit reinforcing
signaling requires the condition of part (i). This condition, which is akin to the \reverse"
hazard rate, is stronger than condition (ii). The most commonly used distributions in
the literature, such as the uniform, the normal and the exponential distribution, do not
satisfy the condition of part (i) but satisfy the condition of part (ii) globally. Thus, it is
13The proof is included in the appendix.
19reasonable to expect case (ii) to occur, which means that the cost of social interaction
is indeed crucial for signaling to have a reinforcing eect on voting incentives.
4.2.2 Bandwagon Eect
Next, we investigate whether there can be a bandwagon eect in our model. Mathemat-
ically, a bandwagon eect exists if and only if14 @BH
@cH > 0, i.e. higher turnout increases







0(p)[qf(cH) + (1   q)f(cH)]
+ w2(n   1)[qf(cH)(H   d) + (1   q)f(cH)(L   d)]
o
(19)
Since 0(p) is negative, the rst term in the curly brackets is negative. This term
shows that electoral benet decreases with higher turnout. The second term, which
corresponds to the change of signaling benet, is positive if and only if signaling is rein-
forcing, i.e. inequality (17) holds. Hence, a necessary condition for a bandwagon eect
(
@BH
@cH > 0) is reinforcing signaling. Given that signaling is reinforcing, a bandwagon
eect exists as long as the second term is higher in absolute value than the rst term,
for instance, for a high enough value for the importance of social interactions (w2).
The intuition is as follows: With a higher turnout, electoral benet of a voter
decreases due to a smaller pivotal probability. However, if signaling benet increases
with a higher turnout, or equivalently if signaling is reinforcing, then the bandwagon
eect may arise. The bandwagon eect exists when the increase in signaling benet is





Until here, we were interested in the sign of various eects. Finally, we analyze the
magnitude of the increase of turnout ratio due to a small increase of the election's
signicance (w1). Note that in a model of voting which does not include signaling
benet, the response of turnout to changes of w1 is small due to low pivotal probabilities
for voters. Therefore, it is important to see whether the inclusion of the signaling benet
can change this result.
14Expressing this condition in terms of the voting benet of a high type agent is sucient, since the
voting benet of a low type agent is proportional.
20As we showed earlier, the election's signicance becomes more important for turnout
ratio when signaling is reinforcing. Indeed, if this reinforcement is strong enough so
that there exists an important bandwagon eect, a small change in the importance of
the election may have a large impact on equilibrium turnout. Mathematically, replacing












@cH is given in equation (19) and
@BH







Since (p) is relatively small, the numerator in equation (20) is expected to be small.
In the absence of signaling benet (w2 = 0), the denominator in absolute value is higher
than 1, since
@BH
@cH is negative. This leads to a low magnitude of
dc
H
dw1. However, in the
presence of signaling, if signaling is reinforcing,
@BH
@cH can be arbitrarily close to 1 (a
stable equilibrium implies that
@BH
@cH < 1) for suciently high values of w2. Then, this





The intuition behind this result is that, if social interactions are very important
for voters (high w2), then even a small increase in the importance of the election may
generate a large increase in turnout, because of the importance of signaling eects.
In other words, since voters expect other voters to turn out in higher numbers, their
own incentive to vote increases signicantly due to signaling purposes and this may
generate a substantial increase on total turnout. This is an important result of our
paper, because it depends crucially on the existence of signaling benets and can not
be generated by the existing literature on rational voting.
5 Conclusion
The paper presents a formal model of voting as signaling device. By observing the voting
behavior of others in their social circle, voters receive a signal about their `neighbor's'
value in social interactions. This generates an additional incentive to vote, apart from
aecting the outcome of the election, as the early rational voting theory predicts. This
21additional incentive can account for the paradox of not voting in large societies and
the role of social pressures in electoral turnouts. Moreover, the model generates several
predictions which are consistent with empirical ndings.
We believe that the model can be extended in order to shed light on the interac-
tion between voting incentives and the role of political parties. In our model, party
preferences are assumed to be independently distributed in each neighborhood. Also
the benet of social interaction is assumed to be independent of voters' preferences
over political parties. However, one would reasonably assume that cooperation among
individuals of similar ideological position is more benecial than if they have very dis-
similar views. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to understand better political
parties' strategic use of advertising and the role of party activists, depending on the
characteristics of neighborhoods.
Overall, we believe that this is a very fruitful avenue for further research and we
intend to extend our model in the near future in these directions.
22Appendix
Second Stage Equilibrium
In order to facilitate the proof of Lemma 1, we rst present two results, which we
summarize in the form of Claim 1. For the rst result, note that, in principle, the choice
of, say, i to interact with j or not may depend on all elements of her information set in
the second stage game: her identity (i), her type ((i)), the signal she has produced in
the rst stage (si) and the signal of her neighbor (sj). Therefore, in principle we can
write her choice as Ii((i);si;sj).
Claim 1. In any equilibrium of the second stage game we have:
(i) Ii((i);si;sj) = I(sj)
(ii) I(sj = 1) = 1 if HH + (1   H)L   d > 0
I(sj = 1) = 0 if HH + (1   H)L   d < 0
I(sj = 0) = 1 if (1   L)H + LL   d > 0
I(sj = 0) = 0 if (1   L)H + LL   d < 0.
The rst result shows that one's decision to interact is independent of one's own identity,
type, and voting behavior. That is, an agent's choice to interact with a neighbor or
not depends only on the neighbor's signal in the rst stage. The second result shows
how this choice changes according to the posterior beliefs of an agent regarding the
neighbor's type. The results hold for pure strategy equilibria, which is the only type of
equilibria we examine in this paper.
Proof of part (i): The most general formulation of i's expected second stage payo
(equation (2)) is given by the following expression:
EPij = w2(i) [(sj)(H   d)Ij(H;sj;si) + (1   (sj))(L   d)Ij(L;sj;si)]Ii((i);si;sj)
However, as one can infer from a quick look at the equation above, the best-response
of i is independent of her type and her identity. This is because we have assumed that
H > L > 0 and therefore the best-response of i is to interact with j if the term in
the square brackets is positive and not to interact if the term is negative, irrespectively
of her type. In terms of notation, Ii(H;si;sj) = Ii(L;si;sj) = I(si;sj). This implies
that also j's best-response to interact with i is independent of j's type and hence we
23can rewrite i's payo as:
EPij = w2(i) [(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)]Ii(si;sj)Ij(sj;si) (A.1)
The subscript on Ii(si;sj) in the expression above is used only to denote who is making
the decision, but the strategy itself is independent of one's identity. We keep it simply
to facilitate exposition and drop it later on.
In the expression above, if Ij(sj;si) = 0, the payo of i is zero, as j does not want
to interact with i, and hence any value of Ii(si;sj) is a best-response for i. This gives
rise to a coordination failure equilibrium where, if j does not interact with i, it is a best
response for i not to interact with j and vice versa. As commented in the main text,
we do not consider this case further.
If Ij(sj;si) = 1, then i's best-response depends on the sign of the term in the
brackets of equation (A.1), which is independent of i's signal. Therefore, whether i
voted or not in the rst-stage does not alter her best-response. In terms of notation
Ii(0;sj) = Ii(1;sj) = I(sj), which shows part (i) of our claim.
Proof of part (ii): The second part of the claim follows immediately. If the bracket
in equation (A.1) is positive and I(si) = 1, then the best-response of i is to interact
and if it is negative then the best-response is not to interact. Hence I(sj) = 1 if
H(H  d)+(1 H)(L  d) > 0 or if (1 L)(H  d)+L(L  d) > 0. I(sj) = 0
if H(H   d) + (1   H)(L   d) < 0 or if (1   L)(H   d) + L(L   d) < 0 (recall
that H = (sj = 1) and L = 1   (sj = 0)).
As commented in the rst part of the claim, if I(si) = 0, then i's payo in inde-
pendent of her action and she may choose any as a best-response. However, if one uses
the concept of trembling hand (which means that each player has an arbitrarily small
chance of making a mistake and choosing the other action), i's indierence to her action
breaks down and we reach the same conclusion as above (when I(si) = 1). 
Proof of Lemma 1
The implication of the second part of the claim 1 is that, when the expected benet of
interaction is dierent from zero ([(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)] 6= 0), then there
are four dierent equilibria of the second stage and they are summarized in section 3.1.
Each one of them is directly derived by a combination of inequalities from the second
part of claim 1. For example, if HH +(1 H)L > 0 and (1 L)H +LL < 0
24then all agents choose to interact with voters and choose not to interact with non-voters,
which results to case 2 in page 10.
When [(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)] = 0, other equilibria may arise. This is
because i is indierent between interacting with j or not. Again, the best-response of i is
any choice of Ii(sj). As a result, there can be asymmetric equilibria of the second stage,
where some neighbors of j choose to interact with her and others do not interact. Since
we are examining only symmetric equilibria in this paper, we ignore these asymmetric
equilibria. Furthermore, the set of symmetric equilibria remains unchanged from the
set dened in section 3.1, even when [(sj)(H   d) + (1   (sj))(L   d)] = 0. For
example, if HH+(1 H)L > 0 and (1 L)H+LL = 0, there is an equilibrium
of the second stage where agents interact with both voters and non-voters (case 1 in
page 10), and another equilibrium, where agents interact only with voters (case 2 in
page 10). Overall, when we focus in symmetric equilibria with no coordination failures,
then the second stage produces the four equilibria we describe in section 3.1. 
First-Stage Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 2
Since BL = BH, BL and BH have the same sign. When 0 < p < 1, they are both
positive since otherwise p = 0 from cmin  0. Hence, BH > BL since  < 1. Therefore,
c
H  c
L. The case c
H = c
L can occur only if c




L  cmax so that c
H = c
L = cmax. But, c
H > cmin since otherwise p = 0. Also
c
L < cmax, since otherwise p = 1. Hence, we conclude that c
H > c
L.
For 0 < p < 1, H and L are given by equations (5) and (6) respectively. By simple
algebraic manipulations, we get








where p = qF(c
H) + (1   q)F(c
L). This dierence is positive since c
H > c
L and f has
a positive density over all of the support. 
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) When we plot BH(cH) on cmin= < cH < cmax, the intersection c
H with the 45
line would be an interior equilibrium satisfying (11). By the continuity of BH(cH) on
25the interval [cmin=;cmax], if BH(cmin=) > cmin= (i.e. the starting point is above
the 45 line) and BH(cmax) < cmax (i.e. the ending point is below the 45 line), then
at least one such intersection exists. Moreover, since at least one intersection is such
that BH(cH) cuts the 45 line from above, a stable interior equilibrium exists if these
two conditions are satised. From Lemma 1, case 2, in an interior equilibrium with
signaling, the second period benet is w2p(n   1)[HH + (1   H)L   d]. With the
cuto points cH = cmin= and cL = cmin, p is equal to p = qF(cmin=) and H is equal
to H =
qF(cmin=)
qF(cmin=) = 1. With the cuto points cH = cmax and cL = cmax, p is equal to
p = q + (1   q)F(cmax) and H is equal to H =
q
q+(1 q)F(cmax). Replacing p and H
in (8) and rearranging, one nds that BH(cmin=) > cmin= and BH(cmax) < cmax are
equivalent to inequalities (12) and (13).
In addition, we have to make sure that this intersection c
H gives an equilibrium
with signaling. This is the case if the two conditions HH + (1   H)L  d and
(1 L)H +LL  d hold for all cH 2 [cmin=;cmax] (i.e. for all possible intersection
points). These two conditions are equivalent to inequality (14) holding for all cH 2
[cmin=;cmax].
(ii) The lhs of inequality (12) is always positive. Hence, this inequality is satised






. Hence, this inequality is satised for high enough cmax.
The lhs of inequality (14) is lower than (1   q)=q since F(cH) < F(cH) for all
cH 2 [cmin=;cmax]. Similarly, the rhs of inequality (14) is greater than (1   q)=q





q (equivalently qH + (1   q)L = d), both conditions are
satised. Hence, there is a neighborhood of values of d around qH + (1   q)L in
which both conditions are satised. Note that this neighborhood for d is consistent
with the fact that inequalities (12) and (13) hold for some parameter values, since the





dH has an ambiguous sign.
26Proof:
@BH


















+ w2(n   1)








The term in the rst bracket is clearly positive and corresponds to the direct eect of
the increased benet of voting and signaling. The rst and the second terms in the
second bracket are also positive and correspond respectively to the increase in voting
benet through higher pivotal probability (for a given cH, cL = cH is lower since an
increase in H decreases , which leads to less turnout of low type agents), and the
increase in signaling benet through the increased benet of a match with a high type
agent and the decrease of the numbers of matches with low type agents (again due
to the lower turnout of low type agents). Hence, turnout ratio of high type agents
increases unambiguously.





[qF(cL=) + (1   q)F(cL)]
+ w2(n   1)

qF(cL=)(H   d) + (1   q)F(cL)(L   d)
o
= cL (A.3)


















The rst term in the bracket is negative and corresponds to the rst eect mentioned
in the text, whereas the second term is positive and corresponds to the second eect.
Hence, the sign of the change of low type agents' turnout ratio is ambiguous. Therefore,
overall turnout ratio can increase or decrease, depending on parameter values. 
Proof of Proposition 3
First we derive the thresholds dH and dL from case 2 of Lemma 1, by substituting the
27relevant values for H and L:
dH = HH + (1   H)L
) dH =
qF(cH)









HqF(cH) + L(1   q)F(cH)
qF(cH) + (1   q)F(cH)
Similarly:
dL = (1   L)H + LL ) dL =
Hq(1   F(cH)) + L(1   q)(1   F(cH))
q(1   F(cH)) + (1   q)(1   F(cH))






, (H   L)f(cH)F(cH) > (=)(H   L)f(cH)F(cH)
, Hf(cH)F(cH) + Lf(cH)F(cH) > (=)Hf(cH)F(cH) + Lf(cH)F(cH)
Multiplying both sides by q(1 q) and adding Hq2f(cH)F(cH) and L(1 q)2f(cH)F(cH)
on both sides yields:
Hq
2f(cH)F(cH) + Hq(1   q)f(cH)F(cH)
+Lq(1   q)f(cH)F(cH) + L(1   q)
2f(cH)F(cH)
> (=) Hq
2f(cH)F(cH) + Hq(1   q)f(cH)F(cH)




Hqf(cH) + L(1   q)f(cH)





HqF(cH) + L(1   q)F(cH)

qf(cH) + (1   q)f(cH)

,
Hqf(cH) + L(1   q)f(cH)
qf(cH) + (1   q)f(cH)
> (=)
HqF(cH) + L(1   q)F(cH)
qF(cH) + (1   q)F(cH)
, ~  > (=) dH






, ~  > (=) dH
When ~  is greater than (resp. equal to) dH, this implies that any value of d that satises
28the equilibrium conditions also satises d < ~  (resp. d  ~ ) . Hence
d2c
H
dw1dw2 > 0 (resp.
 0).
For part (ii), substitute in the proof above the terms 1 F(cH) and 1 F(cH) for







Hqf(cH) + L(1   q)f(cH)
qf(cH) + (1   q)f(cH)
> (=)
Hq(1   F(cH)) + L(1   q)(1   F(cH))
q(1   F(cH)) + (1   q)(1   F(cH))
, ~  > (=) dL
When ~  is greater than dL, the cost of the match d may satisfy d < ~  or not. This
depends on the other parameters of the model. Hence, either
d2c
H








Finally, part (iii) follows from part (ii). This is because when the initial condition of
part (ii) does not hold, then ~  < dL, which implies that the condition d  ~  is mutually
exclusive with the equilibrium conditions. 
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